Sweden's Next-Generation Critical Communications Network Faces Operational Scrutiny as Industry Voices Raise Concerns Over SWEN Readiness

Operational chief involved in the development of Swedish rescue services, has publicly articulated a series of concerns that he argues must be addressed before the transition reaches a point of irreversibility.

Sweden's planned transition from its established TETRA-based Rakel system to the next-generation Swedish Emergency Network, known as SWEN or Rakel G2, is generating growing debate within the country's emergency services and critical communications community, with senior practitioners questioning whether the programme is adequately prepared for the operational realities of public safety communications.

The Core Risks and Concerns

Marcus Wallén, operational chief and a recognised figure in the development of Swedish rescue services, has publicly articulated a series of concerns that he argues must be addressed before the transition reaches a point of irreversibility. Writing on LinkedIn, Wallén stated that he remains fundamentally supportive of the direction of travel, acknowledging that modern public safety communications must evolve beyond voice to encompass video, data and enhanced situational awareness. However, his assessment of the current programme status is cautious. He identifies risks spanning cost escalation, inconsistent implementation across municipalities, insufficient national coordination, and questions over whether the system will deliver the coverage, endurance and field usability that operational emergency services genuinely require.

Replacing a System That Works

Of particular concern to Wallén is the pace of development relative to the deadline. The existing Rakel G1 system is scheduled for decommissioning by 2030, leaving a narrow window within which the successor platform must reach full operational maturity. He notes that prototype solutions demonstrated to date are still perceived by users as falling short of the robustness expected of a mission-critical operational product. This context, he argues, makes the stakes considerably higher than those associated with a conventional technology modernisation initiative. Sweden is not, he observes, replacing a broken system. It is moving away from a communications platform that has functioned reliably, is proven in the field, and is nationally coordinated. The transition is therefore a significant step away from an established capability, rather than a straightforward upgrade.

A Deteriorating Security Environment Raises the Stakes

Wallén's concerns are amplified by the broader security environment. Europe is characterised by a deteriorating geopolitical situation, increasing hybrid threats, and a heightened emphasis on resilience and national redundancy. Against this backdrop, he argues that the state must treat SWEN as a prioritised national total defence capability rather than a technology transition project. He calls for clarity on how national coordination will be assured, how coverage and robustness will be guaranteed, how implementation and future operation will be financed, and how the system will be confirmed as operationally mature before the dependency on it becomes binding.

User Organisations Must Also Play Their Part

Daniel Svärd, an incident commander at Storstockholms brandförsvar, acknowledged the validity of Wallén's analysis while also drawing attention to a parallel challenge facing the user organisations themselves. Svärd questioned the degree to which individual rescue services are actively dedicating internal resources to workshops, expert groups, technology development and requirements processes. He noted that while financing discussions have rightly attracted significant attention, the breadth of organisational preparation required extends well beyond funding, encompassing procurement frameworks, system integration with rescue management platforms, and internal education. His assessment is that the challenge of educating existing organisations alone will prove considerable, and he called for greater resource allocation from user organisations before the window for preparation closes.

Concerns Over Open Application Development

A remarkable perspective from outside the professional emergency services community was offered by Björn Ritzl, who described his reaction on hearing coverage of the SWEN programme on Swedish public radio. Ritzl expressed immediate concern upon learning that system users would have the ability to develop their own applications within the platform, suggesting this approach carries the risk of directing substantial public expenditure toward costly consultancy-driven bespoke development rather than standardised, nationally consistent solutions.

The Agency Responds: Acknowledging Risks, Defending Progress

In direct response to the concerns raised, Ronny Harpe, Deputy Head of Cybersecurity and Critical Communications Services at the Swedish Civil Defence Agency, Myndigheten för civilt försvar, engaged publicly with the debate. Harpe confirmed that he regards the risks identified by Wallén as the most central challenges facing the programme and acknowledged that not all answers are currently available. He emphasised, however, that development of SWEN is proceeding at a pace designed to support the continued rapid build-up of a modern civil defence capability.

On the question of robustness and coverage, Harpe stated that the agency's foundational requirement is for SWEN to function across the full threat scale, including under conditions of heightened alert. He acknowledged that building a mission-critical network on modern 5G architecture represents a substantial engineering and operational challenge, but stated that the objective is unambiguous. By way of context, he noted that the existing Rakel G1 system required extensive annual reinvestment over fifteen years to achieve its current levels of coverage and robustness, a reminder that the development trajectory for any national communications infrastructure is inherently long.

Mandatory Connection and the Fragmentation Risk

On the question of mandatory participation, Harpe confirmed that the agency's position is that connection to SWEN should be obligatory for state, regional and municipal actors, precisely to prevent fragmentation into isolated local solutions. He acknowledged that long-term financing remains one of the programme's most significant outstanding questions, noting that both the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions and representatives of the rescue services have communicated directly to government on this matter. His most substantive message, however, was directed at the user community itself. SWEN, he argued, is not a conventional information technology project and cannot be delivered by the agency in isolation. It represents one of the larger infrastructure programmes in Swedish history and demands substantial commitment from all user organisations. Harpe explicitly encouraged any organisation that does not yet feel engaged with the programme to reflect on how it can increase its participation.

Where the Programme Stands: The Official Picture

The official context for this debate is provided by the second interim report of the government assignment to establish a new communications system for critical actors, submitted by Myndigheten för civilt försvar in March 2026. The report confirms that, as of the first quarter of 2026, the core network for Rakel G2 has been delivered by Ericsson and placed in operation, with the commercial radio access network supplied by Telia integrated in accordance with the planned hybrid architecture.

The system currently offers approximately 94 percent national outdoor coverage, enabling pilot testing and user validation activities. The report also confirms that a migration solution enabling interconnection between Rakel G1 and Rakel G2 has been procured and is being deployed.

Outstanding Dependencies That Could Derail the Timeline

The interim report is candid about the programme's outstanding dependencies. It identifies the absence of statutory priority rights for SWEN traffic over commercial network traffic as a fundamental regulatory gap that directly affects both the timeline and the integrity of the system. It further notes that a decision on reserved spectrum in the 700 MHz band from the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority remains outstanding, that mandatory connection for municipalities and regions has not yet been formally established, and that long-term financing for the programme beyond the current 2025 to 2027 allocation period has not been decided.

The report estimates that the initial funding envelope of 2.3 billion Swedish kronor will enable the system to reach capability level four on the agency's capability ladder, and that achieving levels five and six, which are required to meet the demands of heightened alert and armed conflict, will require additional investment of approximately 3.6 billion kronor during the period 2028 to 2031.

A Test Case for European Critical Communications

The aggregate picture presented by the report and the professional commentary surrounding it reflects the complexity inherent in replacing a mature, operationally proven national communications system with a next-generation broadband platform on a compressed timeline, in an increasingly demanding security environment. The debate in Sweden mirrors challenges being navigated across Europe as public safety organisations transition from established TETRA networks to mission-critical broadband systems under the umbrella of the European Critical Communication System initiative.

The outcome of Sweden's approach, and specifically whether it succeeds in resolving the outstanding questions of regulatory enablement, financing, mandatory participation and operational robustness within the available timeframe, will be watched closely by the broader critical communications community.